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Recent Developments 
Park Station Limited Partnership, LLLP v. Bosse: 
A Gift of Land Is Not a Sale Triggering a Right of First Refusal and Rights of 
First Refusal Do Not Violate the Rule Against Perpetuities 
T he Court of Appeals of Maryland held a gift of 
land is not a sale triggering a right of 
first refusal and rights of first refusal 
do not violate the Rule Against 
Perpetuities (RAP). Park Station 
Ltd. P'ship, LLLP v. Bosse, 378 
Md. 122,835 A.2d 646 (2003). In 
so holding, the court determined a 
collateral benefit received from a gift 
will not transform the conveyance 
into a sale and interests in property 
vesting during a party's lifetime do not 
violate the RAP. Id. 
James and Lois Bosse (Bosse) 
owned, in fee simple, a rectangular 
parcel of land in Anne Arundel 
County. Park Station Limited 
Partnership, LLLP (Park) owned, in 
fee simple, a parcel ofland SlllTOunding 
Bosse's parcel on three sides. In 
1986, the parties entered into a 
contract for reciprocal easements, 
which granted Park rights of first 
refusal in the event Bosse wished to 
sell the parcel. Bosse was required 
to give Park written notice of a desire 
to sell and the sale price and terms. 
Park was required to accept or rej ect 
the terms within thirty days or Bosse 
was free to sell the property to others. 
In 2001, Bosse created a 
religious foundation, Jehovah-Jireh, 
and decided to gift the parcel to them, 
which would result in a tax deduction. 
Bosse informed Park that the transfer 
was a gift without consideration. 
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Park contended the right of first 
refusal applied because the transfer 
was a sale. Bosse filed for a 
declaratory judgment in the Circuit 
Court for Anne Arundel County 
alleging the land transfer was not 
within the right of first refusal and the 
rightoffirstrefusal violated the RAP. 
Both parties filed motions for summary 
judgment. The circuit court declared 
the gift was not a sale within the right 
of first refusal and rights of first refusal 
do not violate the RAP. Park and 
Bosse appealed to the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, but the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland grant-
ed certiorari on its own motion before 
the case was heard. 
The court began its analysis by 
dissecting Park's unsupported 
argument that the transfer of property 
was a sale rather than a gift. Id. at 
128, 835 A.2d at 650. The court 
looked to its Eastern Shore Trust Co. 
v. Lockerman, 148 Md. 628, 636, 
129 A.2d 915, 918 (1915) 
interpretation of the plain meaning of 
"sale," which defined "sale" as 
transferring to another, for valuable 
consideration, the title or right to 
possess property. Id. at 129, 835 
A.2d at 650. 
Fifty years after Eastern Shore, 
the court defined a "sale" involving a 
rightoffirstrefusal. Id., 835 A.2d at 
651 (citing Straley v. Osborne, 262 
Md. 514, 526, 278 A.2d 64, 71 
(1971». Relying on Eastern Shore, 
the Straley court held a transfer of 
property to a corporation without 
consideration was not a sale, did not 
violate any right of first refusal held 
by the corporation, and was a gift. 
Jd. at 130, 835 A.2d at 651. 
The court next analyzed whether 
Bosse's tax benefit constituted 
consideration, making the transfer a 
sale rather than a gift. Id. For a 
transfer to be a sale, consideration 
received must be intended to serve 
as consideration for the transfer. Jd. 
F or the transfer to be a gift, there 
must be intent to transfer property, 
donor delivery, donee acceptance, 
and 'no compensation for the transfer. 
Id. at 131, 835 A.2d at 651-52. 
Therefore, a collateral benefit to a 
donor, such as a tax benefit, has an 
altogether different purpose than 
intended and is not sufficient to make 
the transfer a sale. Id. at 130,835 
A.2d at 651. As a result, the court 
concluded Bosse received no 
consideration from the proposed 
transfer of property to Jehovah-
Jireh. Id. at 131-32, 835 A.2d at 
652. The court found all elements of 
a gift present and the transfer was not 
a sale implicating the right of first 
refusal. Jd. 
The court next addressed 
Bosse's cross-appeal that alleged the 
right of first refusal violated the RAP. 
Id. Maryland retains the common-
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law definition of the RAP that "no 
interest is good unless it must vest, if 
at all, not later than twenty-one years 
after some life in being at the creation 
of the interest." Id. Although the RAP 
generally does not apply to contracts, 
a contract that creates an equitable 
right in real property, such as a right 
of first refusal, subjects the contract 
to the RAP. Id. at 134,835 A.2d at 
653. 
The court of appeals stated that 
the right of first refusal did not include 
Bosse's successors or assigns. Id. 
Since the right of first refusal applied 
only to the Bosses, the right vested 
when the Bosses sold the property or 
was extinguished upon their deaths. 
Id. Therefore, the right of first refusal 
did not violate the RAP. Id. at 135, 
835 A.2d at 654. The court rein-
forced its conclusion by applying a 
principle held in several other 
jurisdictions that addresses rights of 
first refusal. Id. at 137, 835 A.2d at 
655. The principle states rights of 
first refusal are presumed personal and 
not transferable or assignable unless 
the contract granting the right of first 
refusal clearly refers, grants, or intends 
such a right to successors or assigns. 
Id. The principle was reiterated in 
Vogel v. Melish, 203 N .E.2d 411, 
412-14 (1964), holding it 
unreasonable to assume parties intend 
rights of first refusal to survive the 
death of a party when no provision 
for the right is made in the agreement. 
Id. Therefore, the court held a right 
of first refusal does not violate the 
RAP. Id. at 138, 835 A.2d at 656. 
The Park decision is a significant 
effort to solidify several principles 
associated with land transfers - rights 
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of first refusal and contract 
construction. The Park holding 
redefines the proper and fair 
methodology of interpreting 
potentially ambiguous language. 
Further, Park is important to 
Maryland landowners who may 
attempt to protect potential future land 
interests with rights of first refusal. As 
clearly enunciated in this case, a 
landowner with a right of first refusal 
must be aware that those rights may 
be impeded if the contract is not 
properly crafted to include all potential 
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